arXiv Analytics

Sign in

arXiv:cond-mat/0103024AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Minority Games and stylized facts

D. Challet, M. Marsili, Y. -C. Zhang

Published 2001-03-01, updated 2001-03-06Version 2

The Minority Game is a generic model of competing adaptive agents, which is often believed to be a model of financial markets. We discuss to which extend this is a reasonable statement, and present minimal modifications that make this model reproduce stylized facts. The resulting model shows that without speculators, prices follow random walks, and that stylized facts disappear if enough speculators take into account their market impact.

Comments: 6 pages, 2 figures. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Application of Physics in Economic Modelling, Prague 2001. 2nd version: small modification of the abstract
Related articles: Most relevant | Search more
arXiv:cond-mat/0404264 (Published 2004-04-12, updated 2004-12-14)
Price return auto-correlation and predictability in agent-based models of financial markets
arXiv:cond-mat/0004196 (Published 2000-04-12)
Relevance of memory in Minority Games
arXiv:cond-mat/0307332 (Published 2003-07-14, updated 2003-08-25)
Fluctuations and response in financial markets: the subtle nature of `random' price changes