Pierre Cardaliaguet, Catherine Rainer
Published 2018-02-19Version 1
Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.
$N$-player games and mean field games of moderate interactions
Mean Field Games with Singular Controls of Bounded Velocity
Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games, with Applications to Economics
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