{
  "id": "1802.06637",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2018-02-19T14:13:49.000Z",
  "updated": "2018-02-19T14:13:49.000Z",
  "title": "On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria",
  "authors": [
    "Pierre Cardaliaguet",
    "Catherine Rainer"
  ],
  "categories": [
    "math.OC"
  ],
  "abstract": "Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2018-02-19T14:13:49.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "keywords": [
      "mfg equilibrium",
      "efficiency",
      "mean field games",
      "inefficient mfg equilibria",
      "nash mfg equilibria"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 0,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable"
    }
  }
}