arXiv Analytics

Sign in

arXiv:quant-ph/0305076AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Vulnerabilities in Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

D. Richard Kuhn

Published 2003-05-14Version 1

Recently proposed quantum key distribution protocols are shown to be vulnerable to a classic man-in-the-middle attack using entangled pairs created by Eve. It appears that the attack could be applied to any protocol that relies on manipulation and return of entangled qubits to create a shared key. The protocols that are cryptanalyzed in this paper were proven secure with respect to some eavesdropping approaches, and results reported here do not invalidate these proofs. Rather, they suggest that quantum cryptographic protocols, like conventional protocols, may be vulnerable to methods of attack that were not envisaged by their designers.

Related articles: Most relevant | Search more
arXiv:1711.08276 [quant-ph] (Published 2017-11-22)
Optimization of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
arXiv:quant-ph/9810021 (Published 1998-10-07)
Improvement of quantum key distribution protocols
arXiv:2406.09091 [quant-ph] (Published 2024-06-13)
Simulations of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols