Rinaldo M. Colombo, Luca Giuzzi, Francesca Marcellini
Published 2024-11-19Version 1
Different populations of vehicles travel along a network. Each population has its origin, destination and travel costs - which may well be unbounded. Under the only requirement of the continuity of the travel costs, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for all populations. Conditions for its uniqueness are also provided. A few cases are treated in detail to show specific situations of interest.
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Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in two-network zero-sum games
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