Optimal policy for control of epidemics with constrained time intervals and region-based interactions

Xia Li, Andrea L. Bertozzi, P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Published 2024-08-04Version 1

We introduce a policy model coupled with the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic model to study interactions between policy-making and the dynamics of epidemics. We consider both single-region policies, as well as game-theoretic models involving interactions among several regions, and hierarchical interactions among policy-makers modeled as multi-layer games. We assume that the policy functions are piece-wise constant with a minimum time interval for each policy stage, considering policies cannot change frequently in time or they cannot be easily followed. The optimal policy is obtained by minimizing a cost function which consists of an implementation cost, an impact cost, and, in the case of multi-layer games, a non-compliance cost. We show in a case study of COVID-19 in France that when the cost function is reduced to the impact cost and is parameterized as the final epidemic size, the solution approximates that of the optimal control in Bliman et al, J. Optim. Theory Appl., 189, 2021, for sufficiently small minimum policy time interval. For a larger time interval however the optimal policy is a step down function, quite different from the step up structure typically deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, we present a counterfactual study of how the pandemic would have evolved if herd immunity was reached during the second wave in the county of Los Angeles, California. Lastly, we study a case of three interacting counties with and without a governing state.