Miquel Oliu-Barton
Published 2020-03-04Version 1
In this paper, we solve the constant-payoff conjecture formulated by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral (2010), for absorbing games with an arbitrary evaluation of the stage rewards. That is, the existence of a pair of asymptotically optimal strategies, indexed by the evaluation of the stage rewards, so that the average rewards are constant on any fraction of the game. That the constant-payoff conjecture holds for stochastic games with an arbitrary evaluation is still open.
Comments: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1811.04518 by other authors
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