Does randomization matter in dynamic games?

Enxian Chen, Wei He, Yeneng Sun, Hanping Xu

Published 2019-12-30Version 1

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every two-player dynamic zero-sum game with nature has the no-mixing property, which implies that mixed strategy is useless in this most classical class of games. As for applications, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in two-player zero-sum games with nature. Based on the main result, we also prove the existence of a universal subgame-perfect equilibrium that can induce all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in such games. A generalization of the main result for multiple players and some further results are also discussed.