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arXiv:1712.08509 [math.OC]AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Infinitely Split Nash Equilibrium Problems in Repeated Games

Jinlu Li

Published 2017-12-21Version 1

In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.

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