A Game-Theoretic Method for Multi-Period Demand Response: Revenue Maximization, Power Allocation, and Asymptotic Behavior

Khaled Alshehri, Ji Liu, Xudong Chen, Tamer Başar

Published 2017-09-30Version 1

We study a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid with multiple utility companies and consumers. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a Stackelberg game where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash price selection game. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. Based on closed-form solutions, a power allocation game for utility companies has been formulated, and it is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for which a full expression is obtained. We study the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium strategies when the number of periods and users are large. We find an appropriate company-to-user ratio for the large population regime. For privacy, we provide a distributed algorithm for the computation of all optimal strategies.