arXiv Analytics

Sign in

arXiv:1305.0101 [cs.GT]AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Bubbles are rational

Pierre Lescanne

Published 2013-05-01Version 1

As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite world. This goes against a vision of a self regulating, wise and pacific economy in equilibrium. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not a synonymous of stability. We attempt to draw from this statement methodological consequences and a new approach to economics. To the mindware of economic agents (a concept due to cognitive psychology) we propose to add coinduction to properly reason on infinite games. This way we refine the notion of rationality.

Comments: Translation of http://hal-ens-lyon.archives-ouvertes.fr/ensl-00646546
Categories: cs.GT, cs.LO, q-fin.GN
Related articles: Most relevant | Search more
arXiv:1707.01590 [cs.GT] (Published 2017-07-05)
Fairness at Equilibrium in the Labor Market
arXiv:1404.4688 [cs.GT] (Published 2014-04-18, updated 2014-04-21)
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
arXiv:1308.5272 [cs.GT] (Published 2013-08-24, updated 2013-09-23)
On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production