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arXiv:0902.4460 [math.OC]AbstractReferencesReviewsResources

Strategies of Voting in Stochastic Environment: Egoism and Collectivism

V. I. Borzenko, Z. M. Lezina, A. K. Loginov, Ya. Yu. Tsodikova, P. Yu. Chebotarev

Published 2009-02-25Version 1

Consideration was given to a model of social dynamics controlled by successive collective decisions based on the threshold majority procedures. The current system state is characterized by the vector of participants' capitals (utilities). At each step, the voters can either retain their status quo or accept the proposal which is a vector of the algebraic increments in the capitals of the participants. In this version of the model, the vector is generated stochastically. Comparative utility of two social attitudes--egoism and collectivism--was analyzed. It was established that, except for some special cases, the collectivists have advantages, which makes realizable the following scenario: on the conditions of protecting the corporate interests, a group is created which is joined then by the egoists attracted by its achievements. At that, group egoism approaches altruism. Additionally, one of the considered variants of collectivism handicaps manipulation of voting by the organizers.

Comments: 18 pages, 7 figures, translated from Russian by M.A. Kasner
Journal: Automation and Remote Control, 2006, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 311-328. Original Russian text published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2006, No. 2, pp. 154-173
Categories: math.OC, cs.MA, math.PR
Subjects: 91B12, 91B70
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