Search ResultsShowing 1-5 of 5
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arXiv:1905.07966 (Published 2019-05-20)
Utilizing the redundant constraints for the uplift payment elimination
Comments: 26 pagesCategories: math.OCA power market with non-convexities may not have an equilibrium price for power that provides economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this case, the market players are entitled to receive the uplift payments that compensate the economic profit lost when following the centralized dispatch. We consider a special class of the (possibly non-linear) redundant constraints that are redundant not only on the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem (and, therefore, do not change the centralized dispatch outcome) but also on the larger set obtained when the power balance constraint is relaxed. We show that the Lagrangian relaxation of these redundant constraints may reduce the uplift payments without changing the duality gap. For any given market price (or a pricing algorithm that sets the producer revenue as a function of its output volume) in a uninode multi-period power market with fixed load, we explicitly construct a family of the redundant constraints that do not change the maximum profit of the producer and result in zero uplift payment. We show that the introduction and subsequent Lagrangian relaxation of just one redundant constraint in the centralized dispatch problem suffice to eliminate the uplift payments for all the producers. In the case of the convex hull pricing method, the introduction of these redundant constraints affects neither the duality gap nor the market price for power. The results can be straightforwardly generalized to a power market with the price-sensitive load.
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arXiv:1702.03738 (Published 2017-02-13)
Modified convex hull pricing for power markets with price-sensitive load
Categories: math.OCWe consider power market with price-sensitive consumer bids and non-convexities originating from fixed (start-up and no-load) costs and/or nonzero minimal capacity limits of generating units. The convex hull (minimal uplift) pricing method produces the set of power prices, which minimizes the total uplift payments to the market players needed to compensate their potential profits lost by accepting the centralized dispatch solution. All opportunities to supply (consume) any other output (consumption) volumes allowed by market player internal constraints are considered as foregone in the convex hull pricing method. We modify lost profit calculation by defining for each market player a set of output (consumption) volumes, which are economically and technologically feasible in the absence of centralized dispatch, and propose to exclude the rest of output (consumption) volumes from the lost profit calculations. New pricing method results in generally different set of market prices and lower (or equal) total uplift payment compared to convex hull pricing algorithm.
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arXiv:1612.04607 (Published 2016-12-14)
Modified convex hull pricing for fixed load power markets
Categories: math.OCWe consider fixed load power market with non-convexities originating from start-up and no-load costs of generators. The convex hull (minimal uplift) pricing method results in power prices minimizing the total uplift payments to generators, which compensate their potential profits lost by accepting centralized dispatch solution, treating as foregone all opportunities to supply any other output volume allowed by generator internal constraints. For each generator we define a set of output volumes, which are economically and technologically feasible in the absence of centralized dispatch, and propose to exclude output volumes outside the set from lost profit calculations. New pricing method results in generally different set of market prices and lower (or equal) total uplift payment compared to convex hull pricing algorithm.
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arXiv:1507.04478 (Published 2015-07-16)
Antimonopoly regulation method based on perfect price discrimination
Comments: 14 pagesCategories: math.OCWe propose a method of antimonopoly regulation in a day-ahead power market with locational marginal pricing which forms economic incentives for a producer, operating a portfolio of generating units, to submit an offer indicating its true cost and faithful values of technical parameters, entering generating units constraints. The uncertainty faced by regulator when applying the method affects neither nodal output/consumption volumes nor locational marginal prices but manifests itself in overall uplift or downlift for the market, which may be allocated among the other market players in a way preserving the price signals produced by the market.
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On the properties of nodal price response matrix in electricity markets
Comments: Paper shortened and reformatted, some explanations addedKeywords: nodal price response matrix, electricity markets, properties, electric power system, establish sufficient conditionsTags: journal articleWe establish sufficient conditions for nodal price response matrix in electric power system to be symmetric and negative (semi-)definite. The results are applicable for electricity markets with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints.