{
  "id": "cond-mat/0208273",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2002-08-14T09:20:01.000Z",
  "updated": "2002-08-14T09:20:01.000Z",
  "title": "Co-evolutionary games on networks",
  "authors": [
    "Holger Ebel",
    "Stefan Bornholdt"
  ],
  "comment": "9 pages RevTeX, 5 figures PostScript",
  "journal": "Phys. Rev. E 66 (2002) 056118",
  "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118",
  "categories": [
    "cond-mat.dis-nn",
    "cond-mat.stat-mech"
  ],
  "abstract": "We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2002-08-14T09:20:01.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "keywords": [
      "nash equilibria",
      "stationary state",
      "scale-free avalanche distributions",
      "resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game",
      "iterated prisoners dilemma"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "journal article"
    ],
    "publication": {
      "publisher": "APS",
      "journal": "Phys. Rev. E"
    },
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "RevTeX",
      "pages": 9,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable"
    }
  }
}