{ "id": "2212.14449", "version": "v1", "published": "2022-12-29T20:25:18.000Z", "updated": "2022-12-29T20:25:18.000Z", "title": "Policy Mirror Ascent for Efficient and Independent Learning in Mean Field Games", "authors": [ "Batuhan Yardim", "Semih Cayci", "Matthieu Geist", "Niao He" ], "comment": "43 pages", "categories": [ "math.OC", "cs.GT", "cs.LG", "stat.ML" ], "abstract": "Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games in literature. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a \"population generative model\", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Instead, we show that $N$ agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within $\\tilde{\\mathcal{O}}(\\varepsilon^{-2})$ samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard $\\mathcal{O}(\\frac{1}{\\sqrt{N}})$ error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. Next, we prove that conditional TD-learning in $N$-agent games can learn value functions within $\\tilde{\\mathcal{O}}(\\varepsilon^{-2})$ time steps. These results allow proving sample complexity guarantees in the oracle-free setting by only relying on a sample path from the $N$ agent simulator. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by $N$ agents with finite sample guarantees.", "revisions": [ { "version": "v1", "updated": "2022-12-29T20:25:18.000Z" } ], "analyses": { "keywords": [ "mean field games", "independent learning", "policy mirror ascent converge", "running policy mirror ascent", "theoretical results assume variations" ], "note": { "typesetting": "TeX", "pages": 43, "language": "en", "license": "arXiv", "status": "editable" } } }