{ "id": "2106.10706", "version": "v1", "published": "2021-06-20T14:49:51.000Z", "updated": "2021-06-20T14:49:51.000Z", "title": "Feedback Nash Equilibria in Differential Games with Impulse Control", "authors": [ "Utsav Sadana", "Puduru Viswanadha Reddy", "Georges Zaccour" ], "categories": [ "math.OC", "cs.SY", "eess.SY" ], "abstract": "We study a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where players are endowed with different kinds of controls. We assume that Player 1 uses piecewise-continuous controls, while Player 2 uses impulse controls. For this class of games, we seek to derive conditions for the existence of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. More specifically, we provide a verification theorem for identifying such equilibrium strategies, using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for Player 1 and the quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) for Player 2. Further, we show that the equilibrium number of interventions by Player 2 is upper bounded. Furthermore, we specialize the obtained results to a scalar two-player linear-quadratic differential game. In this game, Player 1's objective is to drive the state variable towards a specific target value, and Player 2 has a similar objective with a different target value. We provide, for the first time, an analytical characterization of the feedback Nash equilibrium in a linear-quadratic differential game with impulse control. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.", "revisions": [ { "version": "v1", "updated": "2021-06-20T14:49:51.000Z" } ], "analyses": { "keywords": [ "feedback nash equilibrium", "impulse control", "two-player linear-quadratic differential game", "two-player nonzero-sum differential games", "deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential" ], "note": { "typesetting": "TeX", "pages": 0, "language": "en", "license": "arXiv", "status": "editable" } } }