{
  "id": "2106.03975",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2021-06-07T21:37:44.000Z",
  "updated": "2021-06-07T21:37:44.000Z",
  "title": "Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs",
  "authors": [
    "Galit Ashkenazi-Golan",
    "Janos Flesch",
    "Arkadi Predtetchinski",
    "Eilon Solan"
  ],
  "categories": [
    "math.OC",
    "cs.GT"
  ],
  "abstract": "We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\\epsilon > 0$.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2021-06-07T21:37:44.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "keywords": [
      "repeated game",
      "equilibrium",
      "finite action sets",
      "tail-measurable payoffs admits"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 0,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable"
    }
  }
}