{
  "id": "1707.02598",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2017-07-09T16:14:14.000Z",
  "updated": "2017-07-09T16:14:14.000Z",
  "title": "Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems",
  "authors": [
    "Eilon Solan",
    "Omri N. Solan"
  ],
  "categories": [
    "math.OC"
  ],
  "abstract": "We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot $\\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\\varepsilon > 0$, that is, an $\\varepsilon$-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is a $Q$-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a Nash $\\varepsilon$-equilibrium for every $\\varepsilon > 0$.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2017-07-09T16:14:14.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "subjects": [
      "91A15",
      "90C33"
    ],
    "keywords": [
      "linear complementarity problems",
      "multiplayer quitting game admits",
      "equilibrium",
      "public signal",
      "extended game"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 0,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable"
    }
  }
}