{
  "id": "1705.08160",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2017-05-23T10:11:33.000Z",
  "updated": "2017-05-23T10:11:33.000Z",
  "title": "Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure",
  "authors": [
    "Alekos Cecchin",
    "Vassili N. Kolokoltsov"
  ],
  "categories": [
    "math.OC"
  ],
  "abstract": "We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time and the players have a common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as $N$ grows and show that the problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2017-05-23T10:11:33.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "keywords": [
      "evolutionary game",
      "external pressure",
      "coalition building",
      "infinite dimensional state space",
      "evolutionary control model"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 0,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable"
    }
  }
}