{ "id": "1412.1269", "version": "v1", "published": "2014-12-03T10:56:07.000Z", "updated": "2014-12-03T10:56:07.000Z", "title": "The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration", "authors": [ "Vassili Kolokoltsov" ], "categories": [ "math.OC" ], "abstract": "In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players that can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents, namely pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players. Similarly we develop the theory of evolutionary growth under pressure including coalition building. Mathematically the main attention is payed to situations with an infinite state space of small players arising, in particular, in the models of evolutionary growth. These models are extensively studied recently, due mainly to their ability to predict the power-tail distributions well observed experimentally in the abundance of real world processes (Zipf's law). Our analysis makes it possible to strategically enhance the performance of these laws. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, banks and firms merging and many other.", "revisions": [ { "version": "v1", "updated": "2014-12-03T10:56:07.000Z" } ], "analyses": { "subjects": [ "91A22", "91A80", "91F99", "60J20" ], "keywords": [ "evolutionary game", "small players", "major player", "collaboration", "resistance" ], "note": { "typesetting": "TeX", "pages": 0, "language": "en", "license": "arXiv", "status": "editable", "adsabs": "2014arXiv1412.1269K" } } }