{
  "id": "1402.0861",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2014-02-04T20:55:50.000Z",
  "updated": "2014-02-04T20:55:50.000Z",
  "title": "Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies",
  "authors": [
    "Matt Davis",
    "Michael E. Orrison",
    "Francis Edward Su"
  ],
  "comment": "11 pages; to appear in Contemporary Mathematics",
  "categories": [
    "math.CO"
  ],
  "abstract": "We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We assume that $j \\leq k < n$. For a chosen committee, a given voter is said to be satisfied by that committee if her submitted list of $j$ candidates is a subset of that committee. We examine how popular is the most popular committee. In particular, we show there is always a committee that satisfies a certain fraction of the voters and examine what characteristics of the voter data will increase that fraction.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2014-02-04T20:55:50.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "subjects": [
      "05C62",
      "91B12"
    ],
    "keywords": [
      "agreeable societies",
      "candidates",
      "voter data",
      "chosen committee",
      "popular committee"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 11,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable",
      "adsabs": "2014arXiv1402.0861D"
    }
  }
}