{ "id": "1202.6049", "version": "v1", "published": "2012-02-27T20:44:24.000Z", "updated": "2012-02-27T20:44:24.000Z", "title": "Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems -- Part II: Centralized and Distributed Monitor Design", "authors": [ "Fabio Pasqualetti", "Florian Dörfler", "Francesco Bullo" ], "categories": [ "math.OC", "cs.SY" ], "abstract": "Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malicious attacks so that specific analysis tools and monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper builds upon the results presented in our companion paper [1] and proposes centralized and distributed monitors for attack detection and identification. First, we design optimal centralized attack detection and identification monitors. Optimality refers to the ability of detecting (respectively identifying) every detectable (respectively identifiable) attack. Second, we design an optimal distributed attack detection filter based upon a waveform relaxation technique. Third, we show that the attack identification problem is computationally hard, and we design a sub-optimal distributed attack identification procedure with performance guarantees. Finally, we illustrate the robustness of our monitors to system noise and unmodeled dynamics through a simulation study.", "revisions": [ { "version": "v1", "updated": "2012-02-27T20:44:24.000Z" } ], "analyses": { "keywords": [ "cyber-physical systems", "distributed monitor design", "optimal centralized attack detection", "distributed attack identification procedure", "optimal distributed attack detection filter" ], "note": { "typesetting": "TeX", "pages": 0, "language": "en", "license": "arXiv", "status": "editable", "adsabs": "2012arXiv1202.6049P" } } }