{
  "id": "1108.4114",
  "version": "v1",
  "published": "2011-08-20T13:04:54.000Z",
  "updated": "2011-08-20T13:04:54.000Z",
  "title": "Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies",
  "authors": [
    "Shaun Lichter",
    "Terry Friesz",
    "Christopher Griffin"
  ],
  "comment": "20 pages, 2 figures",
  "categories": [
    "math.OC",
    "cs.SY"
  ],
  "abstract": "Recently, it has been shown that networks with an arbitrary degree sequence may be a stable solution to a network formation game. Further, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of firms participating in collaborative efforts. In this paper, we show conditions under which a graph with an arbitrary degree sequence is admitted as a stable firm collaboration graph.",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "version": "v1",
      "updated": "2011-08-20T13:04:54.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "analyses": {
    "keywords": [
      "collaborative network formation",
      "spatial oligopolies",
      "arbitrary degree sequence",
      "network formation game",
      "stable firm collaboration graph"
    ],
    "note": {
      "typesetting": "TeX",
      "pages": 20,
      "language": "en",
      "license": "arXiv",
      "status": "editable",
      "adsabs": "2011arXiv1108.4114L"
    }
  }
}