{ "id": "0803.4226", "version": "v5", "published": "2008-03-31T12:58:10.000Z", "updated": "2008-09-11T06:37:24.000Z", "title": "Security proof for QKD systems with threshold detectors", "authors": [ "Toyohiro Tsurumaru", "Kiyoshi Tamaki" ], "comment": "6 pages, 4 figures; references changed; revised argument for the security proof; typos corrected", "journal": "Phys. Rev. A 78, 032302 (2008)", "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.78.032302", "categories": [ "quant-ph" ], "abstract": "In this paper, we rigorously prove the intuition that in security proofs for BB84 one may regard an incoming signal to Bob as a qubit state. From this result, it follows that all security proofs for BB84 based on a virtual qubit entanglement distillation protocol, which was originally proposed by Lo and Chau [H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999)], and Shor and Preskill [P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)], are all valid even if Bob's actual apparatus cannot distill a qubit state explicitly. As a consequence, especially, the well-known result that a higher bit error rate of 20% can be tolerated for BB84 protocol by using two-way classical communications is still valid even when Bob uses threshold detectors. Using the same technique, we also prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol where Alice and Bob both use threshold detectors.", "revisions": [ { "version": "v5", "updated": "2008-09-11T06:37:24.000Z" } ], "analyses": { "subjects": [ "03.67.Dd" ], "keywords": [ "security proof", "threshold detectors", "qkd systems", "virtual qubit entanglement distillation protocol", "qubit state" ], "tags": [ "journal article" ], "publication": { "publisher": "APS", "journal": "Physical Review A", "year": 2008, "month": "Sep", "volume": 78, "number": 3, "pages": "032302" }, "note": { "typesetting": "TeX", "pages": 6, "language": "en", "license": "arXiv", "status": "editable", "adsabs": "2008PhRvA..78c2302T" } } }